The 1979 Iranian Revolution, which led to the ousting of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the establishment of an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, is often seen as a moment of stark opposition between Iran and the United States. However, many observers have speculated that the U.S. may have indirectly contributed to Khomeini’s rise, if not by deliberate intention, then by a series of missteps, misunderstandings, and misjudgments that weakened the Shah and allowed the revolution to gain momentum. While it would be an overstatement to say that the United States "put Khomeini in power," the U.S. government’s actions (and inactions) had a significant, albeit unintended, impact on the revolution’s trajectory. This article explores how these factors came together to shape Iran's historic revolution and Khomeini’s ascent to power.
A Troubled History: U.S. Support for the Shah
To understand the 1979 revolution, it is crucial to consider the U.S.-Iran relationship in the decades leading up to it. In 1953, the CIA orchestrated a coup known as Operation Ajax to remove Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, who had nationalized Iran’s oil industry and posed a threat to Western interests. This coup reinstalled the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, consolidating his power and initiating a close U.S.-Iran relationship.
For the next 25 years, the Shah’s regime enjoyed strong U.S. backing, which included substantial military and financial support. The Shah’s modernization initiatives, known as the White Revolution, aimed to transform Iran into a powerful, Western-style nation. However, these reforms disrupted traditional social structures, particularly in rural areas, and alienated key groups, including the clergy, the merchant class, and the rural poor. Simultaneously, the Shah’s heavy-handed rule and human rights abuses, conducted primarily by his secret police (SAVAK), intensified public dissatisfaction.
The United States, while aware of the Shah’s authoritarianism, continued to support him, valuing his alignment with American interests and his role as a stabilizing force in the oil-rich Middle East. However, by the late 1970s, growing domestic unrest and a deteriorating economy signaled a crisis in Iran that the U.S. failed to fully appreciate.
Missteps by U.S. Policy Makers
By 1978, anti-Shah protests had grown more frequent and intense, and opposition to the Shah became increasingly vocal. This opposition was led by a diverse coalition that included liberal secularists, Marxists, and most significantly, Islamists under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was exiled in France but continued to rally support through recorded messages and statements.
Despite these developments, U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, failed to foresee the possibility of a successful revolution. As historian and former CIA officer Kenneth Pollack notes, American policymakers were overly confident in the Shah’s control, assuming that his military strength and the effectiveness of SAVAK would allow him to quash opposition. However, the discontent had reached a tipping point, and the U.S. administration’s lack of awareness about the revolutionary fervor among Iranians led to missteps that undermined their intended support for the Shah.
Attempts at Reform: The U.S. Pushes the Shah to Moderate
One of the key ways the United States inadvertently contributed to Khomeini’s rise was by encouraging the Shah to make political reforms to appease protesters. In an attempt to prevent Iran from falling into the hands of extremists, the Carter administration began to pressure the Shah to relax his authoritarian measures and allow for greater political freedom. President Jimmy Carter’s administration, motivated by its commitment to human rights, was concerned about the Shah’s oppressive policies and encouraged him to release political prisoners, ease restrictions on the press, and grant concessions to opposition groups.
However, these concessions only emboldened the revolutionaries and exposed the Shah’s vulnerability. Rather than diffusing the unrest, the reforms signaled weakness, and many Iranians interpreted them as a sign that the Shah was losing the U.S. support that had previously guaranteed his power. As historian Nikki Keddie points out, this period marked a shift in public perception, with many Iranians concluding that the Shah was no longer invincible and that real change was possible.
Khomeini’s Growing Influence
Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khomeini capitalized on the growing unrest. From exile, he became the focal point for opposition to the Shah, using recorded speeches and written messages that were smuggled into Iran to rally the people. Khomeini’s messaging was sharp and effective, resonating with a wide range of Iranians, from students and intellectuals to working-class citizens and devout Muslims who felt alienated by the Shah’s secularization policies.
The United States, however, failed to understand the extent of Khomeini’s influence or the appeal of his anti-Western, anti-imperialist rhetoric. American officials were dismissive of Khomeini’s importance, perceiving him as an unlikely leader for a country with which they had deep ties. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence underestimated the role that religious ideology would play in uniting diverse factions under a single, Islamist-led movement.
The Collapse of the Shah’s Government
As protests against the Shah intensified, the Shah’s indecisiveness and declining health further weakened his position. Unsure whether to employ brute force or appeasement, the Shah vacillated between harsh crackdowns and conciliatory gestures, neither of which succeeded in quelling the unrest. The Carter administration, meanwhile, gave contradictory signals, at times urging the Shah to show restraint and at other times indicating that he should take a tougher stance. This inconsistency sowed confusion among the Shah’s advisors and further weakened his hold on power.
By early 1979, the Shah’s government was on the verge of collapse. Faced with mass protests, labor strikes, and defections from the military, the Shah decided to leave Iran in January 1979 for what he termed a temporary medical treatment. This departure, however, left a power vacuum that the opposition quickly exploited. Within weeks, Khomeini returned from exile to a hero’s welcome, and his followers swiftly moved to dismantle the old regime.
Khomeini’s Triumphant Return and the Establishment of the Islamic Republic
When Khomeini returned to Iran in February 1979, he was greeted by millions of Iranians, many of whom saw him as a symbol of resistance to the Shah and Western interference. Khomeini wasted no time consolidating power. Within months, he had established the Islamic Republic, dismantling the secular institutions of the former regime and replacing them with a system of governance based on Islamic principles, with himself as Supreme Leader.
The new regime swiftly moved to sever ties with the United States, which Khomeini denounced as the “Great Satan.” The hostage crisis, in which 52 American diplomats were held hostage for 444 days, underscored the new government’s animosity toward the U.S. The revolution thus marked a dramatic shift in U.S.-Iran relations and set the stage for decades of mutual distrust and hostilities.
Conclusion: The Unintended American Role in Khomeini’s Rise
While the United States did not deliberately put Ayatollah Khomeini in power, its actions undoubtedly influenced the trajectory of the revolution. By encouraging the Shah to adopt political reforms, the Carter administration inadvertently weakened his authority and emboldened the opposition. Furthermore, Washington’s inability to grasp the strength of religious sentiment and Khomeini’s appeal blinded it to the momentum of the revolution until it was too late.
The 1979 revolution, therefore, was not simply the result of Iranian dissatisfaction with the Shah; it was also shaped by a series of U.S. miscalculations and misunderstandings. In seeking to maintain stability and promote moderate reform, the United States unintentionally accelerated the fall of a key regional ally and enabled the rise of an Islamic Republic that would be ideologically opposed to American interests.
In retrospect, the Iranian Revolution underscores the complexity of foreign intervention and the limitations of outside influence. Although the United States had successfully intervened in Iran in 1953, by 1979, the context had shifted, and the forces driving Iranian society had evolved beyond American control. The consequences of this revolution continue to shape U.S.-Iran relations today, serving as a reminder of the unintended consequences that can accompany even well-intentioned foreign policy.
Visit:
www.search.alexanderstreet.com/preview/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cvideo_work%7C1793361
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/10/secret-side-iran-us-relations-since-1979-revolution
www.corbettreport.com/another-conspiracy-confirmed-khomeini-had-a-secret-channel-with-the-us
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/10/ayatollah-khomeini-jimmy-carter-administration-iran-revolution
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36431160
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jimmy_Carter%27s_engagement_with_Ruhollah_Khomeini
www.baharmedia.net/2019/03/the-british-and-u-s-governments-installed-khomeini-into-power-in-1979
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